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The Alternative Dispute Resolution Section of the Association of
American Law Schools presented a program, at the 1994 AALS
Conference, on the institutionalization of mediation - through court-
connected programs and otherwise. The topic is an important one,
because this phenomenon has become increasingly common in recent
years. Moreover, the topic seemed especially appropriate for the 1994
program, since Florida - the host state for the conference - was one of
the first states to adopt a comprehensive statute providing for court-
ordered mediation (at the trial judge's option) in civil disputes of all kinds.
The move toward institutionalizing mediation has raised many questions,
and this program was designed to highlight those questions, and provoke
this discussion about them. The panel for the program was composed of
mediation scholars, teachers and practitioners, from eight diverse
jurisdictions around the country, with expertise on many different aspects
of the institutionalization issue. The program was organized by Professor
Baruch Bush (Program Chair), together with Professor Carol Liebman
(Section Chair) and Dean James Alfini (Panel Moderator). This article
presents an edited transcript of the panelists' comments.
DEAN JAMES ALFINI: As you know, mediation has captured the interest
of lawyers and judges. And, as a consequence, we are seeing the growth
of court-sponsored mediation programs. The general question we'll be
addressing today is: What are the real and potential effects of this
institutionalization of mediation? In particular, we'll concern ourselves
with the impact of institutionalization on: First, the mediation process.
Second, the parties to the dispute, or the case in court. Third, the lawyers
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and the legal profession generally. Fourth will be the courts. Our
broader purpose is to begin to assist in constructing both a research agenda
and a policy agenda for this important area. So as we discuss what we
know about mediation and its institutionalization, I hope we'll keep in
mind that we should be also identifying what we need to know in order to
make better policy decisions. Our method will be a hybrid of sorts that
will consist of the somewhat traditional scholarly panel presentation along
with aspects of a socratic dialogue. My role will be that of a traffic cop -
to keep things moving along, to permit the airing of all issues and to give
everybody their due.
Let's put the discussion in a hypothetical context; you need one of
those for a socratic dialogue. Because you are all familiar with that form
of pedagogical abuse, this should be a relatively easy group to deal with
on that score.
The Chief Justice of the State of Fiss [laughter] - glad that
reference is not lost on some of you - is very interested in bringing
mediation into the court system, particularly into the trial court system.
Specifically, the State of Fiss is interested in using mediation to deal with
small claims disputes, family matters, divorce cases, and, ultimately, with
larger stakes civil cases. A number of policy making groups within the
state - the state legislature, judges, lawyers, and citizens groups such as
the League of Women Voters - are very concerned about bringing this
new dispute resolution process into the judicial system. There is also a
strong group of private mediators who have organized themselves into an
association of real mediators within the State of Fiss. They are also
concerned about what might happen to mediation as it is brought into the
court system. Our panel is a consulting team that has been brought into
the State of Fiss with the purpose of advising these policy makers on these
important matters. As the embodiment of the interests of these policy
making groups, I will be asking each member of the panel questions
relating to the impact of institutionalization on the mediation process and
the parties, on the legal profession and on the courts. We'll give each
panel member a certain amount of time - this is where it becomes a bit
more traditional, we won't be moving along quite as quickly as some of
these socratic dialogues do - but if they get bogged down, we'll try to get
them unplugged.
Let's start with the concerns of the professional mediator in the
State of Fiss. As you can imagine, their general concern is whether, once
the court system - particularly lawyers and judges - get their mitts on this
new process, mediation as they know it - good mediation - will come to
an end. Whether lawyers and judges will, in fact, bastardize the process.
Now, Professor Bush, I know you have thought long and hard
about this, and you've written quite a bit on it. What's your advice to us?
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Is that likely to happen? Is it likely that there would be negative effects if
mediation becomes institutionalized?
PROFESSOR BARUCH BUSH: The first thing that I'd say, if I were talking
to the private mediators, is that perhaps you ought to be concerned not just
about what lawyers and judges will do to the process, but what mediators
themselves sometimes do to the process. Perhaps the best way to put it is
like this: We've learned a number of things over the years. One
important thing we've learned is that mediation is malleable. There are
different ways to do it, different approaches and different versions of the
process. It's quite fluid. So there always have been different approaches
to the process and, if you want to call it a mediation movement that we're
involved in, different faces to the movement. I might distinguish them as,
on the one hand, a kind of "technocratic" face to the movement, in which
mediation is basically used and seen as a faster, cheaper way to resolve
disputes, to produce certain kinds of outcomes that are considered better
substantive outcomes - in short, a good technology for solving problems.
And, on the other hand, there is what we might call a "humanistic" face to
the movement in which mediation is seen as a way of helping parties to
strengthen themselves and relate to each other as they work through
conflict. The thing to be concerned about as mediation becomes
institutionalized - not just through connections with courts, but in other
ways, which I'll mention in a minute - is that what tends to happen is the
hardening of mediation practice into one of those images rather than the
other, and the version that tends to get crystallized is the technocratic face
rather than the humanistic face.
Let me be a little more specific, because there are a number of
different things that we can consider institutionalization. Courts' and
lawyers' involvement is one. This tends to mean that the advancement of
settlement and agreement is set up as an all important goal of mediation
because disposition of cases matters very much to courts. Also, legal
standards become imported into the definition of what constitutes a good
agreement in mediation, as opposed to purely the parties' preferences. In
some of the research that I did several years ago on mediators' perceptions
of ethical conflicts in mediation, there was evidence of mediators feeling
the pull of the pressure to get settlements, and the pressure to shape
outcomes in a certain direction that would conform to legal standards and
fairness ideas in legal terms, rather than being non-directive and allowing
more party self-determination. Standardized mediator training that courts
accept - which tends to focus in the direction of a settlement-driven model
- is another influence in that direction.
On the other hand, there are forces of institutionalization within
the profession itself that tend to move the field toward the technocratic
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model. Professor Austin Sarat, who's been a critical observer of this field
for many years, said at a conference last year that mediators should forget
about being a social movement and realize that they really are simply
practitioners of a useful skill which ought to be sold to parties like other
useful skills. Again, this suggests the technocratic model. The growth of
a number of professional organizations of mediators might be seen as an
institutional force working in this direction.
DEAN ALFINI: Well I wouldn't say that we private mediators aren't
concerned about our batting averages, but they're not public record as they
are, to some extent, with these court-appointed mediators. The judges, at
least, know what their batting averages are. And there are all sorts of
pressure on them to push, coerce, cajole, what have you.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Well once you private mediators begin working with
judges, your batting averages also become known. Because that's one of
the effects of that connection. And, therefore, batting averages become
more important, even for private mediators. The general point is that the
effect of all these kinds of institutional forces is that practice hardens in a
certain image. A growing body of research on practice suggests, that
despite the image of mediation as reflecting self-determination and a more
humanistic face, actual practice follows more of a problem-solving or
technocratic approach, a directive approach to the process. In this
approach, mediators commonly hear the parties' stories, diagnose what the
problem is, suggest or prescribe a solution to it in the form of a suggestion
or a recommendation - however indirectly framed - and then essentially
try to persuade the parties to accept that suggestion. Sometimes this is
less heavy-handed and more nicely done - and other times it is less nicely
done and more heavy-handed. But that kind of directive model of practice
seems to be quite predominant, as opposed to an approach that focuses
more on self-determination, choice-making, communication, perspective-
talking - concepts that originated the field of mediation. People like Jay
Folberg, Josh Stulberg, Lon Fuller and others talked about re-orienting
parties to one another, helping them make decisions - not directing to
problem solving, but assisting in decision-making and communication. But
this dimension has tended to get less emphasis the more the process
crystallizes.
So what I would tell mediators is, not only because of connections
with the courts, but in general, watch out for that. Watch out for that
trend and for that influence in institutionalization. Particularly because it
seems to me that, in the larger sense, this trend essentially means that
rather than being alternative dispute resolution, mediation will wind up -
if that's the direction it goes in - as adjunct or supplementary dispute
INSTITUTIONALIZING MEDIATION
resolution. it will not be so much an alternative to the kind of justice and
dispute resolution done by courts and other authoritative decision makers,
but, essentially, old wine in new bottles. Mediation had, and has, the
potential to offer something truly different - something truly alternative.
However, if that's going to happen, this trend towards crystallization into
the technocratic model must be avoided.
Finally, I think that mediators themselves are the best source of
control on this trend. My research on ethical dilemmas suggested that
mediators are quite hesitant about this trend towards crystallization in the
technocratic model. At least, they're confused about it. They seem to
still think that they ought to be doing something other than simply
producing settlements and solving problems, and that there is an
importance to focusing on a more self-determining, communicative model
of mediation. They're confused about how to do that - with all these
pressures in the opposite direction - but at least one could regard that
hesitancy itself as a positive thing. Therefore, I'd encourage mediators to
be hesitant and to take time to reflect before the field moves too fast in
this direction.
DEAN ALFIM: Thank you Professor Bush. Professor Liebman do you
have anything to add to that?
PROFESSOR CAROL LEBMAN: A few points; some additions to the watch-
out-for list. In the two states that I'm familiar with that have high
volume, routinized mediation - there are real problems which professional
mediators have to watch out for. The experience of many parties in those
systems could discredit the whole process. Trina Grillo, whose chair I'm
humbled to sit in and can by no means fill, has detailed some of the
abuses that take place in California, where custody mediation is
mandatory. California uses a mediation-arbitration model where, if the
parties don't reach an agreement, the mediator makes a recommendation to
the court - and experience has been that those recommendations are
almost always followed by the court. In New York, my clinic students are
mediating citizen-initiated complaints diverted from the criminal courts.
The N.Y. statute allows neighborhood justice centers to use either
mediation or med-arb to resolve cases. Happily the use of med-arb model
seems to be declining, but a problem remains. While, in theory, the
parties' participation in ADR is voluntary, in practice either the case is
resolved through mediation, or the parties are sent away until something
more serious happens.
The California and New York experiences teach critical lessons
about institutionalizing ADR. The higher the volume, the more routinized
and de-humanized the process is likely to become, the more important the
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doorkeeper to the multi-door courthouse becomes and the harder that door
keeping job is. In New York, many citizen-initiated criminal complaints
are diverted to mediation: People come to the courthouse saying, "I want
an order of protection," often having been told by the police, "We can't
help you, go get an order of protection." Then they are sent into the
mediation screening process and told, "Hi, too bad you don't have enough
bruises, where are your hospital records? You can't have an order of
protection, but we've got a wonderful thing for you. We'll set up a
hearing and you'll go in front of a hearing officer." Here's the actual
language of a recent screening and referral of a case for mediation "OK,
what we're going to do is send you to a hearing," not mediation, but a
hearing. "We'll issue a summons which you can serve on the person
complained against." (And actually half the time the form says
SUMMONS, although it is supposed to say REQUEST TO APPEAR.
And that summons, or that request to appear, gets served by a police
officer. This is all "voluntary.") And then the screener went on to say:
"At the hearing you will be able to explain what you have put on this
complaint to a hearing officer who will hear both sides and then he'll try
to reach an agreement which you can use to control your future behavior."
I think that's not atypical of what happens in the high volume mediation
programs. And if that's what happens at the intake process, one has to
worry about what happens during the mediation.
It is difficult to maintain quality when you get mediators -
sometimes paid, sometimes getting expenses, sometimes volunteers - who
are doing a number of these every day, with little or no supervision.
Because they usually do solo mediations, there's not even the input and the
check of a co-mediator. What happens to the parties in that mediation
room is something about which you professional mediators would be right
to be concerned. My students were recently co-mediating with an
experienced mediator. The case involved two women who were having a
fight over the same man - he was married to one of them, had given her
several children over seven or eight years, and was actively involved with
the other. Before the second woman even began telling her story, the
mediator turned to her and said: "Well you knew he was married, didn't
you?" I think concerns raised by the opponents of mediation become more
powerful as mediation becomes institutionalized, gets into the court
system, and becomes high volume. So I think that these concerns are very
real, but the solution isn't to say "don't go into the courts." The solution
is to be very clear with the courts about, as Baruch said, what the limits of
the process are, what the rules of the process are. If what you want is a
quick fix, faster/cheaper mediation and that's all you want, mediation can
be a very serious problem in terms of cutting off peoples' rights and
pushing them out of the system without their getting a fair process -
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whether it's a fair hearing or fair mediation.
DEAN ALFNI: Would you agree with Professor Bush that the existing
private mediation group, so to speak, could have a significant influence on
the growth of mediation within the judicial system?
PROFESSOR LIEBMAN: Oh, I think so. And I think that if the private
mediators don't take a role there, they're going to give up both the future
credibility of the process and also a lot of the action.
DEAN ALINI: I shouldn't do this as the moderator, but there's an
anecdote jumping out here in my mind. When I was down here at Florida
State and they were forming the first mediation and arbitration rules
committee of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice called me and asked if
I would sit on that committee, and I said that "I would be honored." Then
he said, "Who else should sit on there?" So I started giving him the
names of people who had been mediators - not only private mediators,
but mediators from informal, court-sponsored programs before the advent
of real institutionalization. Most of them were not lawyers. And he said:
"Non-lawyers on a rules committee?" and I said, "But Chief, these are the
people in the trenches, laboring in the trenches." He repeated: "Non-
lawyers on a rules committee?" Needless to say, there weren't any real,
pre-existing private mediators on that rules committee. So I think that is a
problem. The judicial system isn't likely to want to establish a dialogue
with this group, particularly since many of them are mental health
professionals rather than lawyers. Michele Hermann, do you have some
thoughts on how this might affect the process?
PROFESSOR MICHELE HERMANN: The worst way to institutionalize
mediation is when the court comes in, in a state of crisis, and says:
"We've got too many cases and we can't keep up. We're lagging years
behind and, therefore, we will turn to mediation for a quick fix." That
means that the court is looking to only one part of mediation, and will
probably get its quick fix, but will lose all the richness and the variation
that could have been present in mediation. So the first thing I'd say to the
Chief Justice is: "Look at what mediation might do for you." Actually,
in New Mexico we do mediation training partly for law students and partly
for people who come and pay to take it, some of whom are lawyers, and
one of whom was the Chief Justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court.
He said he came to the training because he was looking for tools in court
and case management. He said he left the training realizing that for some
kinds of disputes, whether or not you have a court in crisis, this might be
a better way for people to explore resolutions to the conflict. So my first
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thought is that the impact of institutionalization is going to be driven in
part by the motivation of the courts that institutionalize.
My second thought picks up on something that both Baruch and
Carol mentioned, and that is that we seem to be assuming that this is going
to happen in the context of the multi-door courthouse. What is most
important in structuring, the institutionalization of ADR in general is an
appropriate dispute diagnosis system at the beginning. There are lots of
cases, Baruch, that are just fine with technocratic, distributive, directive
sorts of settlement processes. Those are disputes where exclusively money
is an issue, where there is no prior relationship or post relationship
between or among the parties - a classic example is personal injury
automobile cases. These are cases that are going to settle anyway. Folks
get stuck in settlement. You don't really need that full rich...
DEAN ALFINI: ... empowerment and recognition model...
PROFESSOR HERMANN: . . . exactly. So if you have good dispute
diagnosis then you can offer different choices to different kinds of cases.
DEAN ALFINI: Len Riskin, do you have some thoughts?
PROFESSOR LEONARD RIsIUN: Well, I'd like to examine Michele's
assertion that there are certain kinds of cases in which distributive
bargaining is just fine, and that personal injury cases are a good example.
I think that is probably true of the vast majority of personal injury cases.
But I always try to structure my mediations to allow the participants to
discuss non-monetary concerns. This is not simple. On Monday, for
instance, I mediated a personal injury claim against a nursing home by the
survivors of an elderly woman who was injured and ultimately died
because of the negligence of a nursing home employee. They were asking
for a great deal of money, and in the middle of this mediation, one of the
plaintiffs said, "Look, I don't care about the money. All I care about is
that no one should have to go through what my grandmother went
through. And the only way that I can have an impact on the nursing
homes is to get a lot of money from them, and then they'll start paying
attention."
So in my private caucus with the defense lawyers and the claims
adjuster, I asked, "Can you do anything to respond to her interests in
getting the nursing homes to change their practices?" We then spent much
of the caucus talking about what they could do; they made phone calls to
executives in the insurance company and in the nursing home. These
executives agreed in principle to take certain corrective actions, and the
plaintiffs were pleased about that. But the plaintiffs faced the tension that
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Lax and Sebenius described, in The Manager as Negotiator, between
value-claiming and value-creating. In my caucus with them, I learned that
the plaintiffs really did care about getting as much money as possible -
and so did their lawyer. And, of course, the defense expected to pay less
if they promised to improve conditions in nursing homes. When we ended
that day's session, the parties were still $200,000 apart.
On the general problem of institutionalization, what I wanted to
say is that we have to be really careful about the terminology we use.
Baruch was putting problem-solving mediation and adversarial mediation
in one cluster, which may cause confusion. I like to distinguish between
mediation that facilitates an adversarial negotiation and mediation that
allows for problem-solving (or interest-based) negotiation, which could
include opportunities for transformation.
In Baruch's work, there is a strong focus on mediation's potential
for transformation, for actually changing people. That's what pulled me,
and lots of others in this room, into this field. I think we need to
recognize, however, that talking in those terms will dissuade a lot of
people from taking part in mediation and, moreover, that instances in
which mediation produces significant change in people may be rare.
Transformation is a wonderful, but occasional, side-effect. On the other
hand, a mediator can, and I believe should, structure the mediation - even
in a personal injury claim - to allow for the human dimension, if the
participants wish to pursue that dimension. Thus, for instance, the
mediator might encourage the plaintiff and defendant (not just the
insurance company representative) to attend and participate in the
mediation. I also think, however, that very few people who are in the
litigation process will be enticed into an alternative process that promises
personal transformation, rather than emphasizes settlement. I regret to say
all this, and I wouldn't have said it twelve years ago.
DEAN ALFINI: But in a way though, your remarks go to mediation
generally and not just institutionalized mediation. Is that correct?
Whether it comes to a private person before its filed in court, or whether
it's in an institutionalized setting there's nothing about its occurring in the
context of the judicial system that makes it less inclined or useful in terms
of personal transformation.
PROFESSOR RIsN: I think the fact that people have gone to lawyers and
are in a judicial process means that, for most of them, the dispute has
been transformed from a human problem into a legal problem and into the
question of how much money they can get or protect. It's possible, and
often desirable, to use mediation to transform the dispute back into a
complex, human problem. But this appears more difficult, typically, the
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farther the dispute has proceeded in litigation. It may be easier to do this
at an earlier stage in the dispute, before the matter has crystallized into a
legal issue. Still, many interest-based mediators function very effectively
with cases that are in the litigation process.
DEAN Aumnu: Okay. I know that some of you, particularly Baruch Bush,
would like to respond to some of what's been said. But I am assuming
that you would know how to work your remarks into other portions of the
discussion. I'd like to move away from the problems of the process and
towards the impact on parties. We in the State of Fiss - particularly the
lawyers, because they are so client oriented and protective of client's
rights, as well as some of the private groups, including the League of
Women Voters - are concerned about peoples' rights: how people are
going to be treated, justice in a general sense, what might happen to the
parties, particularly what might happen to parties who are more likely to
be vulnerable in the more informal setting of the mediation session. That
is, outside the court and unprotected by the procedural safeguards that they
would normally expect in court, what's going to happen to the parties?
What's going to be the impact of institutionalized mediation on the parties
themselves? Now, Professor Hermann, we know that you've been doing
some research on this topic. Could you tell us what we are likely to
experience here?
PROFESOR HERMANN: Well, I think that you have to distinguish between
mediations in which parties are represented, and mediations in which
they're unrepresented. The research that we did went to the latter.
Specifically, we took a total of six hundred cases filed in our small claims
court in Albuquerque, New Mexico. With the cooperation of the court
and our local mediation program, we were able to assign these six hundred
cases randomly to mediation or adjudication so as to compare outcomes.
We wanted to look at objective outcomes and subjective satisfaction.
Hopefully many of you have read the work of Vidmar who has devised a
formula by which you can compare outcomes, rather than using dollar
amounts. We used Vidmar's formula as our objective measure, and then
we did lots of interviews to get a sense of subjective satisfaction. What
we were looking at was whether women and disputants of color fared
differently than men and Eurocentric disputants in adjudication and in
mediation.
In the mediation literature, women have been predicted to do
worse in mediation. Now those predictions come in the divorce area, and
is important to recognize that being a mom, mediating about the parenting
of your kids and the support you're going to receive to help pay for the
needs of those kids, is really different from coming in to small claims
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court and mediating that this guy didn't change your tire right or that you
haven't been able to keep up your payments on your TV set. Keeping this
distinction in mind, our study in mediation found that women did better in
mediation than they did in adjudication. And women did better than men.
The flip side in terms of satisfaction was that women liked mediation less
than they liked adjudication and were most likely to describe the mediation
process as being unfair when their case was co-mediated by two women.
So that's how women do.
In terms of disputants of color, who in our sample were eighty-
seven percent self-described Hispanic, the minority disputants did
somewhat worse in adjudication than did white disputants, but not enough
to be really statistically significant. In mediation they did dramatically
worse than did white disputants. What I mean by dramatically worse is:
If you were a claimant, a plaintiff of color, you would get eighteen cents
on the dollar less than if you were white, and if you were a respondent of
color you'd pay twenty cents on the dollar more than if you were white.
The thing that was perhaps the most startling of all our results was that
those objective outcome differences disappeared when the mediators were
also mediators of color. That was not true if the case was co-mediated by
a white mediator and a mediator of color; that didn't make a difference.
But if both of the mediators were mediators of color then the outcome was
no longer distinguishable from the outcome of white disputants. Then,
lastly, in terms of satisfaction, both claimants and respondents of color
were more enthusiastic about mediation than they were about adjudication,
and were more enthusiastic - I mean just dramatically more enthusiastic -
then were white people in mediation.
DEAN AuNI: Thank you, Professor Hermann. Ms. Press, your state has
perhaps been institutionalized the longest - and there is nothing like
institutionalizing a state. Would you give us your sense of what the
impact's been on the disputing public, on the parties themselves?
Ms. SHARON PRESS: Well I think that it's had a significant impact.
Mediation in Florida has been institutionalized in a major way since 1988.
And I think that right now it has fundamentally changed the way business
is done in the courts in Florida. What we knew before we started was that
approximately ninety-six percent of all cases settled and did not go on to
trial. And I think that's fairly universal; it's not only in Florida. What
the difference, then, has been is not a dramatic rise in the number of cases
that are settling and are not going to trial, but, in my view, what we've
seen is a difference in how those cases settle. Traditionally the way cases
settled - those ninety-six percent - is that the two or more lawyers who
are representing the parties get together outside of their clients and discuss
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settlement, and they come up with a settlement and that settlement is then
presented to the clients. The clients don't have as much input or as much
understanding as to why the case is settled the way it is settled. The
difference in an institutionalized system like Florida is that the parties are
mandated to participate in those settlement discussions. And that, to me,
is very significant because now instead of lawyers going behind closed
doors and working out some kind of agreement, parties are actually
involved in the settlement discussions. I think this helps people to
understand what's going on and I think it leads to better settlements as
well.
We also know that people didn't choose to go to mediation, at
least initially, when they didn't understand what the process was about;
they weren't signing up and running out to do pre-suit mediation. They
weren't thinking, once they had lawyers, that they should ask to go to
mediation. Now that we have five or six years of institutionalized
mediation experience, the courts need to mandate mediation in fewer
cases. In more and more cases, the parties are saying to their lawyers
they would like to use mediation. More and more times the lawyers are
coming in and telling the judge "we want to go to mediation" and "this is
when we want to go to mediation." So in that way, having an
institutionalized system - at least initially in mandating it - you educate
the parties and spread mediation in a way that is much faster than if you
went through a slow learning curve of just letting people seep through the
system.
If you really want to jump-start institutionalized mediation, then it
has to be something like what Florida did - which was to do it in a major
way, not in a pilot, but state-wide, and most cases are eligible to be
mandated to mediation. What's been interesting to note is that in Florida's
system, the parties in our larger circuit-level cases - (civil cases over
$15,000) - traditionally pay for mediation. It's not court-staffed and
mediation is not provided free of charge. With that as an underlying
premise, one would have expected that there would have been a lot of
lawsuits filed questioning 1) whether this was appropriate to mandate, and
2) whether it was appropriate to have people pay for this. They've
already paid their filing fees. They're in court already. What's been
interesting is that there have been no law suits filed that have even
questioned whether this is constitutional, appropriate, or anything. And
that, to me, was one of the very surprising but also one of the telling
things that said that this works - the parties are satisfied with the process
even if it doesn't result in a settlement.
The other thing to point to in that regard is that in 1992 Florida
instituted standards of conduct for mediators and a grievance procedure for
parties, attorneys, and anyone actually involved in the mediation process to
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file a grievance against a mediator for violation of the standards of
practice. That was instituted in May of 1992. To date we have had only
seven grievances filed. That is another measure, I think, of the fact that
what's going on out there in an institutionalized system is working and that
people are satisfied with it. There is a method for them to articulate what
their dissatisfaction might be.
The final point that I have is slightly outside of the court system,
although I think it has some possible ramifications for it. By participating
in a mediation - whether it be mandated or not - I think that there is a
spillover effect to people involved in it, that they learn that there are ways
to resolve disputes. This was dramatically shown to me when I worked in
a high school mediation program - a different kind of institution but an
institution nonetheless. The students that came in as the disputants learned
a process, learned a way of thinking about disputes that they may not have
thought about before. And what we saw was that many of them wanted to
become mediators. Many of them used those skills and those ideas in
future disputes they had. So I think that, again, unless you have wide-
spread institutionalization or the placing of this process in institutions, you
don't have that kind of spillover. If you accept mediation as being a
"good thing," then it seems as though institutionalization and putting it into
institutions makes it possible to spread that "good thing."
There is a downside. I know that I have been concerned and that
there are many people in Florida that are concerned about what happens
when you rigidify a flexible process. Mediation is by nature supposed to
be a flexible process, and what we have seen over the course of
institutionalization is that every year there are more procedures, more
rules, more standards, more grievance procedures, more laws. There are
more and more layers, and with each layer we add we know why we're
adding it, we think that it's important to add it because there are further
protections that are needed. And yet when all is said and done, is it
overly rigidifying a process that was meant to be flexible?
DEAN ALFINI: Professor Liebman, do you have some thoughts on the
institutionalization's impact on the parties?
PROFESSOR LIEBMAN: My thoughts on that were implied in what I said
before. I have one other set of comments. When we have a well worked
out system and, when lawyers are present, I have far fewer concerns than
in the small claims setting or in the citizen-initiated criminal complaint
setting, where parties are typically unrepresented and are not well
informed about their rights. There the process may be called voluntary,
but it is in effect, mandatory because people say "I'll try it" without
understanding what their other options are.
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I have another real concern that we seem to be making decisions
to cut out whole categories of cases from consideration by the courts.
Many cases that are sent to mediation in New York City would be taken
seriously by neighborhood courts in other communities: somebody waving
a gun in somebody's face. We're saying that in the big cities, we don't
have the time, we don't have the resources to deal with these cases, we're
going to send these people to mediation. We're cutting people out of the
court process without the kind of public debate and thought which that
kind of decision requires.
DEAN ALFINI: Well, indeed, I think that Professor Hermann was
addressing a different subset of court cases than Ms. Press. Ms. Press
was largely looking at the cases where the parties are represented by
attorneys as well as high stakes civil cases, where Michele was talking
about largely the small claims, the cases where parties are unrepresented.
Putting those two together, and knowing what I know about Florida - and
knowing the answer to this question - there is one thing we should
probably ask, since my sense is that Michele was pointing to some evils
and then said "but they can be mitigated if you have a mediator of color."
Ms. Press, how many certified mediators do you have in this state system
now? A couple of thousand?
Ms. PREss: Correct, a couple of thousand.
DEAN ALFINI: How many mediators of color -- percentage?
Ms. PREss: Percentage wise, a very, very low percentage - less than five
percent.
DEAN ALINI: So, is there a way for the State of Fiss to avoid or
improve upon that track record? Is there a way of recruiting more
mediators from more diverse populations?
Ms. PREss: It's a question that we are struggling with right now, and if
the State of Fiss figures it out, I hope they let the State of Florida know.
We'd like to know how to do it. We don't know what the problem is -
whether its a recruitment problem, whether its a cultural problem or some
other problem. It is, however, an issue that is on our agenda for this year
to look at. How we can rectify that situation?
DEAN ALFINI: Right. John Barkai, do you have any thoughts on this
issue?
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PROFESSOR JOHN BARKAI: I would like to comment on subjects raised by
Michele and Sharon. Michele's impressive and useful research raises the
question, "What is 'culturally appropriate' mediation?" I work in Hawaii,
probably the most culturally diverse state, and do trainings in the Pacific
Islands and the Asia/Pacific rim countries. My experience is that different
cultures use different forms of mediation. In Asia, mediation is often
referred to as "conciliation." Asian conciliation, in either a business or
personal setting, typically includes the seeking of an opinion from a wise
and respected person within the community whom Westerners might call a
mediator. However, this Asian mediator/conciliator would not have had
any special training in mediation. ADR training is a Western process. The
Asian mediator's input is what Westerners would consider a non-binding
arbitration opinion. Asians expect opinions from mediators. They do not
seek or expect something that looks like American community mediation
which seeks to enhance communication, empower the parties, and uncover
underlying interests. The cross-cultural counseling literature supports a
similar view; Asians typically prefer more directive counseling. All of
this leads me to the conclusion that if a mediator is working with
disputants from other cultures, the mediator might want to ask, "What
kind of mediation assistance would you like to have?"
Sharon talked about mediation in which parties are represented by
lawyers. I thing that mediation is different when lawyers come to the
mediation table without their clients. In civil litigation, parties often do
not appear at the mediation, only the lawyers appear. Lawyers are used to
engaging in the settlement process without clients present. Clients are
usually not brought to judicial settlement conferences. Even when parties
do appear at mediation sessions or settlement conferences, the client
appearing as the "defendant" is frequently an insurance company. The
real defendant in a tort suit often has no input into the settlement process.
Mediation between parties, but without the actual defendant present, raises
the interesting questions of whose interests are being represented in
mediation and how do frequent, repeat players like insurance companies,
impact the process. The same insurance company representatives might
frequently attend mediations, and become very sophisticated about
mediating law suits.
DEAN ALFINi: Professor Bush, I knew I'd see your hand go up. Let me
ask you a direct question. Can we empower insurance adjusters?
PROFESSOR BUSH: I actually want to comment on something else, but I'll
briefly answer that question by an anecdote similar to the one that Len
Riskin told. It concerns a mediation that I observed here in Florida, by a
very astute mediator, between a personal injury victim and an insurance
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adjuster. And it was actually a textbook example of how you could indeed
empower an insurance adjuster and indeed evoke some human
understanding between the adjuster and the victim. So, yes, I think you
can. And I think that, again, our imaginations tend to be constrained by
the frameworks out of which we operate and perhaps some of the bitter
experiences that we suffer through, but that we ought to resist the
temptation to abandon ship too early.
I wanted to comment, actually, on one thought about Michele's
research, which is fascinating - going to the question of whether people
care about things other than money, and how widely? In other words, is it
only in a very few cases or is it a lot of cases? One possible explanation
for some of the sort of paradoxical results that Michele got - and there
could be many others - is that perhaps people don't care mostly about
money. One way of reading Michele's results, is that one group got more
in the material sense - did better -- but liked it less. The other group got
less, but liked it more.
DEAN ALFINI: It's sort of the flip side of Lind et al's research on court-
sponsored arbitration programs. That is, outcome is less important than
process. They're finding that people are less concerned about outcome
and much more concerned about...
PROFESSOR BUSH: . . . I don't think it's the flip side, I think it could be
read as entirely consistent with that research. It could be that the reason
why women liked mediation less was that it wasn't outcome that mattered
to them most, it was how the process worked, how they were treated. So
even though they got favorable outcomes, they disliked mediation because
something else mattered more to them. And for the disputants of color, it
was the same thing. Even though they got unfavorable outcomes, they
liked mediation because something else mattered more.
DEAN ALFiNi: I mean flip side in the sense that their findings generally
find high satisfaction with the process, as opposed to Michele's findings -
low satisfaction with the process, even though they did well.
PROFESSOR BUSH: Again, the point is, these results raise questions about
the assumption that people care mostly about outcome the vast majority of
the time, and care much less about other more humanistic dimensions.
Maybe this just isn't the case.
DEAN ALFINI: Let's turn to the legal profession. We are all very
interested in that topic since we are the ones that supply that profession.
Professor Hyman, you've been doing some research on settlement
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conferences recently. Does that research suggest how mediation or its
institutionalization might have an impact on lawyers and the legal
profession generally?
PROFESSOR JONATHAN HYMAN: Well, first, I should say that there are
going to be no changes of any meaningful kind - the kind that we're
talking about here - unless the lawyers are fully involved in the changes.
And, even then, it's a high risk proposition and the probabilities are that
you're not going to see much change in the situation. One piece of advice
that I have for the State of Fiss is that if you want to get the lawyers
involved you might try the strategy that New Jersey has recently tried,
where I've done my research, and that is to call it "complementary dispute
resolution" rather than "alternative dispute resolution." That's what the
New Jersey court rules now call it. But it still remains an open question
as to whether that approach to lawyers - telling them that they still count
and what they do is still important - will have any long term effect.
I think the key to a lot of these questions is the depth and
sophistication of the understanding of lawyers, themselves, about the
mediation process. If they see mediation in a kind of mechanical light -
trying to speed up a series of offers and demands and exchange of
concessions - if they see mediation as the way to advance that kind of
dispute resolution process, which is the one they're mostly familiar with,
then I don't think that institutionalizing mediation is going to have much
effect for things other than small claims. I can't speak to matrimonial
cases, because I haven't looked at that. But in terms of most civil
litigation - over claims the size of the dollar amount necessary to get a
lawyer involved - it's not going to have much effect. The dynamics of
that kind of bargaining process, which delay cases because everyone is
afraid to make that last concession, is going to take over the process.
But I think there are terrific opportunities for change. When we
did a survey of civil litigators in New Jersey - these are non-matrimonial
civil cases claiming over $5,000 - we asked them about two kinds of
settlement practices. These questions were not directed at mediation, but I
think they relate to it. One we called positional and one we called
problem-solving. This is sort of making a distinction that Len was talking
about before. The problem-solving method was characterized by a mutual
discussion of the underlying needs and interests of each side. Agreement
results not as much from an exchange of concessions as from new
proposals that both parties think meet their needs. Settlement proposals
can involve the exchange of goods or services in addition to or instead of
money, or they can tailor the terms and conditions of monetary payments
to the unique needs of the parties. We received five hundred responses to
our questionnaire, and surveyed most of the lawyers who were on the trial
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lists over a period of time throughout New Jersey. They reported to us
that at least seventy percent of the cases that they knew about in their
experience were settled by the positional method, not by the problem-
solving method. But sixty percent of the respondents wanted more of the
problem-solving method. And almost half wanted less of the positional
method.
Problem-solving is a method that lawyers can sometimes
implement. We saw a number of interesting examples of settlement that
left everyone better off. So this settlement approach is something that
lawyers can recognize, however dimly, and something that they would like
to have. This would tie in closely with what mediation can do; it's this
kind of situation in which a mediator can be very helpful.
But, by and large, the lawyers we surveyed were not able to do
it. Problem-solving settlements were not happening. I think one of the
unanswered questions is, why were lawyers not making the process
become more like they wanted it to be?
I think that there is a substantial risk that if you institutionalize the
process of mediation, you're going to have what happened in New Jersey
with its mandatory non-binding arbitration for automobile cases. Initially
when mandatory non-binding arbitration for automobile cases was
implemented, according to the Rand study that was done, it slowed down
the disposition of cases, because all the lawyers were waiting for the
arbitration hearing before they sat down to settle the case. And now, even
though auto arbitration is widespread, more than half of the cases result in
a request for trial de novo. Of course, most of those don't go to trial.
They are settled sometime between the arbitration and the trials, usually
towards the last minute I think.
So, there's a substantial risk that the lawyers are going to swallow
whatever system you adopt. They're going to keep replicating the same
things they do now, and they'll take control of it. But there's an
opportunity for letting lawyers participate in expanding the use of problem-
solving methods and finding ways that they can do that. That might be a
substantial change in your system.
DEAN ALFINI: It's interesting that your research is taking place in the
state of New Jersey about thirty years after Maurice Rosenberg's classic
pre-trial conference study. Professor Riskin, do you have some thoughts
on the effect on lawyers and the legal profession?
PROFESSOR RisiuN: I do, and I think Jon Hyman's findings, which I
heard about for the first time only a few minutes ago, are very
encouraging in the sense that they show that a lot of lawyers aspire toward
more problem-solving or interest-based approaches to settlement. Such
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approaches to mediation have great potential for changing the way lawyers
practice outside of mediation. The whole idea is to encourage lawyers to
think broadly and to think in terms of underlying interests. Much depends
on how court-connected mediation programs are designed, what kind of
training the mediators get, who the mediators are, and so forth. The
situation is not as uniformly gloomy as some of us imagine. For example,
Bob Ackerman, who's here from the Dickinson School of Law, was telling
me this morning about a new mediation program in the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The planners decided that
this program would not be about clearing dockets principally, but about
getting better resolutions.
The question is: How does that sort of goal translate into an
actual mediation, or into actual law practice - for instance in interviewing,
counseling or negotiation? Even if the training emphasizes interest-based
approaches, some lawyers resist understanding such approaches or
internalizing or operationalizing the values associated with such
approaches. An illustration of this arose during a training I conducted for
a bar association program for mediation of fee disputes between lawyers
and clients. One of the participants in this workshop was the most
ferociously adversarial lawyer I've ever known. I was frightened when I
saw his name on the attendee's list. During the training, he continually
questioned our basic assumptions, although he seemed to be fully engaged
in the role plays. When the workshop ended, he came up to me and said,
"I want you to know that I really enjoyed this training. I don't see any
practical use for mediation, but the training was really fun."
So even if training programs emphasize interest-based approaches,
there is still a question of whether lawyers will see practical uses for such
approaches. It is easy to forget that there are things besides money that
count. I've started to observe my own negotiations and I've determined
that sometimes I am not faithful to what I preach. Perhaps this is true of
others as well.
And I think that what we need to do is to go on a campaign
simply to make the bar and bench aware that there are different kinds of
mediation. Thus, if the Chief Justice wants to have narrow, adversarial
mediation, that's okay, but he or she should understand that that's a
decision, and that by making that choice the program not only gains
something, but also gives something up. Still, I think we should seize
opportunities - when we teach, when we mediate, and when we serve on
committees with lawyers and judges - to remind people that mediation can
do more than simply settle cases.
DEAN ALm: Let's turn to a couple of other people here and see whether
there's been in the two states that I guess have the most experience with
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court-sponsored mediation programs, Florida and Texas, a noticeable
impact on the bar. Ms. Press, here in Florida?
Ms. PRESS: Yes I think there has been.
DEAN ALINI: It's a kinder, gentler profession?
Ms. PRESS: Well, there certainly are more and more lawyers who are
participating in mediation training. We keep track of all the people who
take the training, who go on to get certified. Only about fifty percent of
those people who complete mediation training actually go on to become
certified. I think many of them fall into the category of people who think
it's very interesting, they'd like to know what it is that the mediators are
going to do to when they go to mediation. But, its not quite for them to
do. I think this is also a very good thing for people, to be able to sort
themselves out and decide, "No, this isn't quite for me."
But I think that the lawyers report that they really like the process
for a variety of reasons - even though in reality it does cut into fees.
There are many lawyers whose practice is as trial advocates and will say
that they have seen a significant drop off. But they still think that the
process is very worthwhile, because they like the idea of having their
clients present during settlement discussions. And they like the idea of not
having to be in this awkward position of having to first, convince clients
that they have this wonderful case, that they should pursue it and how
good their case is and then, having to go back and say, "Well you know
your case really isn't that good." This way, with mediation, they can stay
with the position of what a great case you have, go to a mediation, and the
party can hear for themselves that it isn't such a great case, and they can
hear from the mediator, they can hear from the other side, and it becomes
a much easier process for the lawyers to deal with. The reports are, that
lawyers actually like the way mediation fits in with the whole scheme of
litigation in the state of Florida.
DEAN ALFINI: Professor Kovach, what's happening in Texas?
PROFESSOR KIMBERLEE KOVACH: Well, about the same thing. I also
train lawyers and about fifty percent of those who take the forty-hour
training do so to become mediators. The others do it to learn about the
process. And I think in doing so they are getting back to perhaps what we
lost in the monetary driven 1980s, and that is the more human side of law
practice: the counselling, if you will, side of law practice. Several
practicing mediators report to me that many times they'll ask the client in
the mediation: "What do you really want out of this?" And the client's
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immediate response is: "Gee, no one ever asked me that before." At this
point, however, lawyers are becoming more aware that: "Well, maybe I
ought to counsel a little bit more with my client." Learning mediation
skills I think is really bringing that back. And so I think we are seeing a
more cooperative bar. Those lawyers that are familiar with the process -
instead of what was commonplace in the mid to late 1980s in Texas, the
Rambo litigator, which was file the motion, send the paper over,
messenger it over and we'll talk later - really pick up the telephone again
and start by talking voluntarily. And I would advise the State of Fiss that,
if you do it right, you might even be able to turn this into a way, perhaps,
of improving the public's image of lawyers. In doing some volunteer
work, etc., that our local bars are doing.
DEAN ALFINI: Let's stay with you for a moment. Texas, again, has been
introducing more and more court-sponsored programs into their judicial
system. The final set of concerns that we have, have to do with the
impact on the courts. Many of our legislatures think this means that we
won't need as many judges. And they're real happy about that. Are we
going to need more resources? Less resources? Is it going to make for a
more efficient court system? Less efficient? But will it be more just? Or
less just? What's the likelihood of the impact on the courts?
PROFESSOR KOVACH: It depends. It depends on what I think the state is
willing to do on the front end. I think it also depends on identifying the
specific goals, which was brought out earlier. If you're really looking at
reduction of case load, we have that already. Only four percent - and
that's true in Texas as well - of cases go to trial. You're not going to see
a significant change in that. In fact, it backfired in some courts in that -
and this is small but I think worth thinking about - the courts that did not
take the time at the front end to become educated about the mediation
process, educated about referral, and things like that, ended up spending
more time on a case because of objections on the referral process, on the
selection of the mediator, or fee issues, etc. So, unlike Florida, we've
only had three or four cases reach the appellate level. But I get, for
instance, a couple of calls a month saying: "I've got this motion for
sanctions because somebody didn't show up or bring the client to
mediation." And so, I think unless the judges are willing to be educated
and involved in the process early, they may end up causing more work for
themselves. And it also then depends on what kind of program you want
to implement. And if you have the resources. Under the Civil Justice and
Reform Act, I think many of the courts initially thought there were going
to be additional resources to implement many of these programs, both in
terms of staff and staff mediators. What has turned out in the latest round
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of plans is that once the resources dried up, ADR plans and mediation
plans have been the first to be dropped out of those plans.
So I think the State of Fiss really needs to look at its budget and
specific goals and do the work on the front end, rather than rushing into it
and implementing it right away.
DEAN ALmINI: Thank you Professor Kovach. Professor Barkai, your state
of Hawaii has had a relatively long history with court sponsored arbitration
program. But you also have a number of mediation programs throughout
the islands. Do you have a sense of what the impact of institutionalization
will be on the court system itself?
PROFESSOR BARKAI: I can't use the words "it depends," but I'm not sure.
I'm optimistic. We have mediation programs in most every form of
dispute resolution, except for criminal. We have mandatory small claims
mediations on Ohau, we have large civil claims. We have divorce
mediation. We have a wide variety. What I'm afraid of is that the courts
are beginning to lose sight of the goals; the judges are beginning to take,
to some degree, the attitude that maybe somehow mediation and other
forms of ADR can keep it out of my court.
DEAN ALFINI: Did they have a sort of a consensus of the goals up front,
because it has been my experience, particularly in Florida, that this was
the case. Did they confer initially and was there a consensus that "these
are our goals"?
PROFESSOR BARKAI: In court-annexed arbitration they did have initial,
explicit goals - reducing costs and increasing the pace of litigation.
Progress towards those goals could be empirically measured. In other
forms of ADR, the goals are less explicit and more difficult to measure.
For example in divorce mediation, the explicit goals of reducing parental
conflict and having the settlements be more in the best interest of the
children are very difficult to quantify and measure.
In Hawaii and across the country, we now are beginning to see
people look back at the earlier goals of ADR programs, and in my
opinion, rewrite the history of these programs by changing the goals.
They are changing the original goals because empirical evidence does not
indicate that the original goals of these ADR programs were met.
Available research seldom shows that trials were reduced, costs decreased,
or pace increased. People who manage ADR programs are now saying,
'Actually, our goals are to increase the ways of settling cases that we have
been settling before." I do not think that is why courts instituted ADR
program - not to settle cases that were already being settled. Originators
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of this believed that ADR would reduce the number of cases going to trial
and thereby reduce costs. However, the evidence just does not show that.
Effective institutionalization of mediation will require that people
who are interested in the management and evaluation of mediation
programs keep a watchful eye. My sense is that many judges are not very
interested in evaluation. They are not very concerned with whether
mediation actually reduces costs and delay. Judges are mainly interested
in removing cases from their dockets.
DEAN ALFMI: They see these programs as diversion programs?
PROFESSOR BARKAI: They hope mediation diverts cases from the trial
track, but the court may not know whether the diversion effort is being
successful. I know that might sound hard to believe, but it certainly is
true in Hawaii. Our state has very poor statistics on trial rates. We know
the number of cases filed and the number of cases terminated, but we
know little more than that.
For five years, colleagues and I did an evaluation of the Hawaii
Court-Annexed Arbitration Program. As part of the evaluation, we
collected the trial rates reported in the court statistics. Our evaluation
concluded that there seemed to be some reduction (although not a
statistically significant reduction) in the trial rates since the introduction of
the arbitration program. Later we compared the court's statistics to the
statistics collected by a commercial, civil jury verdict reporting service and
found that the jury reporting service found two and one-half times more
trials than the courts reported. We were shocked that the court's statistics
were so inaccurate.
As we try to forecast the future of mediation in the courts, I think
that we are failing to look at the incentives and disincentives ADR holds
for lawyers. The practice of law is a business, and lawyers are trying to
figure out how ADR will impact their practice. The fee structure
significantly impacts incentives for using ADR. There is not much
economic incentive for a lawyer on an hourly-fee to engage in mediation,
court-annexed arbitration, or any form of ADR before almost all pretrial
discovery is complete. Although ADR may mean reducing costs for
clients, it also means reducing income for lawyers. There is an obvious
conflict of interest there.
However, ADR is becoming more pervasive in our culture, and
lawyers and clients are being drawn to increased use of mediation. Today
most law schools offer at least one ADR class. In a few years, almost
every lawyer will have had some form of ADR training. And clients also
will become more knowledgeable about ADR. In fact, the future growth
of client requests for mediation is currently being sown in elementary and
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secondary schools in this country. Students at every educational level are
taking mediation classes and being trained to become mediators. When
today's child mediators become parties to tomorrow's lawsuits, they may
demand mediation for their cases.
But coming back to the question, "What's in it for the lawyers?" -
I do not think that lawyers see a satisfactory answer to that question today.
So I think it is really important that researchers and theorists focus more
on questions like "What's in it for the lawyers?" and "What incentives will
encourage clients into mediation?" "Can mediation really reduce delay and
costs, improve access to justice, and result in higher quality settlements?"
"Can we structure the process so that it creates greater incentives for
lawyers to use ADR?"
DEAN ALFiNI: Professor Bush, I'll be a little more liberal with you on
this go around.
PROFESSOR BUSH: There is a wide range of what's being talked about
here today. On one end, the discussion is about adversarial mediation for
certain kinds of very instrumental purposes, and what's in it for lawyers,
and for courts interested in settlement rates. On the other end there is,
talk about the transformational, humanistic dimensions of mediation. I
want to comment on the connections between one end of this range and the
other. For example, regarding John's questions about what's in it for
lawyers and courts: One answer to what's in it for lawyers is that, if
there are effects available in mediation that constitute a better service to
clients, in the client's own self-defined terms, then it ought not to matter
to lawyers whether it fits into their pre-existing legal-cultural concepts of
what they're supposed to be doing. They ought to learn how to do
something new. If we have an ethic of professional responsibility, then
representing the client's interests has to be read somewhat broadly, more
broadly than the context of the adversarial process alone.
That raises the question of what's in it for the parties or courts.
In this regard, I want to echo Len Riskin's suggestion, that even the courts
are interested in something other than settlement and outcome. One court
administrator recently said to a colleague of mine: "We've come to the
conclusion that mediation doesn't improve settlement rates, and it doesn't
save time, and it doesn't save us a lot of money either; but we think there
is still something important about providing this alternative to the
community, because people seem to regard it as having greater value.
And perhaps our job ought to be to provide that kind of satisfaction, even
if we don't know exactly what it is, and it doesn't relate to settlement
rates, and speed, and costs and the like." In other words, there is
something else that mediation provides, the undefined value, and both
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parties and courts are interested in it.
What I want to suggest is that this undefined value may well be
not simply better problem-solving, or better solutions to problems, but it
may indeed be "transformation." And I want to urge people in the State
of Fiss, and elsewheie, not to be afraid to talk about transformation, even
to lawyers, but instead to de-mystify this term into something that people
can understand and relate to. If achieving transformation means changing
people - not just changing the situation, but changing the people - it can
be understood in a modest rather than a grandiose sense. When parties to
conflict are helped to gain clarity about their goals and options, and to
make decisions for themselves about what to do, they grow stronger in the
process. When they are helped to gain awareness and appreciation of the
other party's perspective and situation, they grow more considerate in the
process. These kinds of incremental growth are transformative. To put it
in even simpler terms, if people are able to find ways of working through
conflict that involve acting with somewhat greater strength and
compassion, and with somewhat less weakness and self-absorption, this is
transformation. Perhaps this is possible at least to some degree much
more often than we think; and perhaps this is what people want - at least
some dimension of what they want - much more often than we think.
Maybe lawyers are even interested in providing or helping people
to achieve this much more often than we think. A lot of lawyers are
interested in mediation and mediation training, not for economic reasons,
but because of the way in which the adversary process affects them and
the people that they work for. In short, as "institutionalization" proceeds,
I would argue for not placing transformation off the end of the spectrum.
Instead, I think we need to de-mystify that term, and talk about the
possibility, and value, of change on a much more incremental, much more
"micro" level. It's too soon to rigidify things and say, "this is possible
and this is not," even when we're talking about courts, lawyers and
"purely monetary disputes." It is certainly true, there are cases where
people don't want to have somebody assist them in approaching conflict as
a sort of change process. If so, then that shouldn't happen; that should be
clearly a choice of the parties. On the other hand, if this kind of approach
is not even available, because institutionalization has made it difficult or
impossible for this to occur in mediation, then that's a limitation of choice
of a different kind. And I don't think that's a wise idea to do that at this
stage of our development.
DEAN ALFINi: Jon, you have some comment about the impact on the
courts?
PROFESSOR HYMAN: Well it seems from what we've been talking about
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here that you shouldn't rely on any institutions to make changes; that
changes have to come from the bottom up - from the people on a more
micro level. The proper role of the courts seems to be more in making
those kinds of changes possible, understanding them, welcoming them,
providing room for them, encouraging them, but not trying to
institutionalize them. Now if the courts go too fast in trying to
institutionalize these programs, then the iron laws of the bureaucracy begin
to take over and the bureaucracy has to perpetuate itself and it has to have
its own forms and rules and the work has to get done by the bureaucrats in
a certain way. So I think that you can't get any expert advice here about
what the courts should do, other than encourage change and remain
flexible and keep avenues of communication as open as possible. And
maybe - since the courts are often driven by a crisis mentality, we're so
inundated we have to do something that will be the quick fix - they should
understand that things are going to change every five years or so.
Whatever they do now, in five years from now, things might look quite
different, and they should be working on trying to maintain the values of
open access, procedural regularity, and fair decision making, in the
context of a lot of change going on in the administrative and bureaucratic
part of their operation. So we come down with very little specific advice
on what the State of Fiss can do.
DEAN ALFINI: Right, well we people of the State of Fiss thank you very
much. Let's give our panel a hand.
